



Throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the rapid economic
development of Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan,
and other Asia-Pacific countries under restrictive political arrangements
led to claims of the superiority of a so-called Asian model of democ-
racy.1 Touting the strength of Asian culture and values in contrast to the
perceived moral turpitude and social decay of the West in general and
the United States in particular, proponents of “Asian-style democracy”
argued for the virtues of quasidemocratic government that ranked hier-
archy and order over individualism and competition. In truth, this was
at base a model of nondemocracy—and one that faded quickly from
prominence in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, which laid bare the
structural weaknesses of East Asia’s political and economic systems.
The political reforms that the region has seen since then have set the
stage for the advent of a more genuine “Asian model” of democracy. In
something of a grand irony, this model is coming to resemble the Anglo-
American system of majoritarian electoral competition and two-party
politics. This movement toward more predictable and consolidated rep-
resentative government has been eased by strategies of overt political
engineering across an increasingly diverse array of electoral democra-
cies in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific islands. Regimes
throughout the region have sought to recraft their political systems in
order to encourage elections that are more decisive, parties that more
coherently aggregate interests, and governments that are more stable.
The number of Asia-Pacific governments chosen through free and
competitive elections reached an all-time high in recent years. In a
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region that just a decade ago lay largely under authoritarian sway, there
is now a clear trend toward accepting democracy as the only legitimate
means for choosing and changing a country’s political leadership. Over
the past two decades, successful transitions from authoritarian rule have
taken place in East Timor, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan,
and Thailand (although the Thai coup of September 2006 may mark the
end of this process). Liberal democracy has also survived, although not
without problems, in Papua New Guinea and most of the Pacific-island
countries. With the addition of Japan (East Asia’s sole established de-
mocracy), this means that most of the Asia-Pacific’s major states, bar
China, are today competitive electoral democracies—a truly historic
shift in world affairs.
The quest for more representative and effective governance across
the region has spurred broad institutional reforms that focus on reward-
ing or constraining particular kinds of behavior. Many political-engi-
neering strategies concentrate on the creative design of electoral systems
as the institutions best suited to promoting better representation and
governance. Long-running scholarly debates are gaining renewed real-
world cogency as Asia’s decision makers and citizens discuss the rela-
tive merits of presidentialism versus parliamentarism; the devolution of
power via decentralization, federalism, or regional autonomy; the de-
velopment of political parties and party systems; and the design of con-
stitutional structures more generally. All these debates seek answers to
what Giovanni Sartori, writing almost forty years ago, called “the cen-
tral question of political engineering,” namely, “How can we intervene
politically in steering and shaping a process of political development?”2
Across the Asia-Pacific region, ambitious and often highly innova-
tive forms of political engineering have lately become the norm. Electoral
reforms in ethnically heterogeneous new democracies such as Indone-
sia have sought to promote crossregional political parties that can
operate as agents of social integration. Japan, Korea, the Philippines,
Taiwan, and precoup Thailand each introduced majority-enhancing elec-
toral systems intended to foster political aggregation and penalize
splinter parties, while a number of states—Indonesia again prominent
among them—have embarked upon major exercises in political and
administrative decentralization. In the island Pacific, the troubled but
resilient postcolonial democracies of Papua New Guinea and Fiji (which
suffered a coup in December 2006) have introduced ambitious constitu-
tional-reform packages designed to aid stable multiethnic governance.
A number of broader trends have driven reforms across the region.
For instance, many recent interventions in political development echo
the way that East Asia’s industrializing states used targeted sectoral
strategies in the 1970s and 1980s to promote economic growth. Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan were the most prominent exemplars of this
“developmental-state” model, which relied on interventionist indus-
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trial policies rather than the invisible hand of the market. With the
democratic transitions of the 1990s, this interventionist approach to
economic development began to be replicated in the political arena as
well, through deliberate strategies of political engineering. Attempts to
craft “democratic developmental states” in the Asia-Pacific region can
thus be seen as efforts to extend into the political arena an approach
that once worked in the economic sphere. Ironically, the 1997 Asian
financial crisis, which dealt a severe blow to the state-guided develop-
ment model, also helped this process by giving voice to long-repressed
social cleavages, delegitimizing incumbent leaders, and stimulating an
intense struggle for political reform in countries such as Indonesia, Thai-
land, and South Korea.
Electoral Engineering
A particularly striking political-engineering trend in recent years
has been in the area of electoral-system design. Because electoral sys-
tems determine how votes translate into seats, such systems are central
to deciding who governs. The elements that make up an electoral sys-
tem—the votes-to-seats formula, the way that districts are drawn, the
structure of the ballot, and the extent to which voting is candidate-
centered or party-centered—each exert an independent influence on
the behavioral incentives facing political actors, and hence on the de-
velopment of political parties and the kinds of campaign strategies and
policy appeals that parties employ.
Although forms of government, political cultures, and degrees of
democratic consolidation differ from country to country, patterns of
reform across the region show more evidence of convergence than di-
vergence. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand
have all enacted strikingly similar electoral reforms. One clear trend is
the growing popularity of mixed electoral systems that combine aspects
of proportional representation (PR) with the majority (or plurality) prin-
ciple in order to gain the advantages of both. A PR system’s basic aim is
to give each party a share of legislative seats that matches its share of
the overall vote, ensuring that even small minorities can be fairly repre-
sented. The most common type of PR calls for each voter to choose en
bloc among a number of lists of candidates rather than to vote for indi-
viduals. Plurality or majority systems, by contrast, usually feature a
competition between individual candidates, and typically ensure that
the party winning more votes than any other (a plurality) or more than
half the votes (a majority) can control the legislature.
In mixed systems, PR governs the choice of part of the legislature,
usually by treating the entire country as a single at-large district, while
plurality or majority rules are used to fill the rest of the seats, which are
elected from discrete districts. While mixed systems have become com-
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mon around the world in the past decade, they have been a particularly
popular choice in Asia—perhaps because they promise to combine the
sense of fairness that comes from a proportional outcome with the sense of
accountability that comes from linking seats to distinct districts.3 In sharp
contrast to similar reforms in other parts of the world, however, most
Asian mixed systems are highly majoritarian in both design and practice,
leading to quite distinctive outcomes compared to other regions.
This majoritarian bias is evident in a number of ways. As Table 1
illustrates, Asia’s mixed systems, in contrast to those in Europe or Af-
rica, are heavily weighted in favor of the district-based element of the
system. In South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, only about 20
percent of seats are chosen by the proportional method. In Japan, the
figure is 38 percent; in Taiwan’s new system, it is 30 percent. In all
cases, however, the bulk of seats in the legislature are chosen by plural-
ity rules from single-member districts. The lack of any mechanism to
compensate for this bias toward the plurality or majority rule, combined
with the relatively small number of proportional seats on offer, penal-
izes smaller parties while working to the advantage of large parties with
a national scope.
This distinctive political architecture stands in direct contrast to the
international norm, where well-known examples of mixed systems, such
as those in Germany and New Zealand, feature an equal or nearly equal
split between proportional and district seats. Asia-Pacific states have
also rejected the kind of compensatory mechanisms used by these coun-
tries, in which list seats are allocated in such a way as to produce propor-
tional outcomes overall. Instead, Asia’s mixed systems, like those found
in much of Central Europe, run the list component of elections in paral-
lel with the district contest, with no effort to produce any particular
balance between the outcomes. Again, the effect is to advantage larger,
nationally focused parties in the allocation and distribution of seats.
Despite this convergence in institutional redesign across the Asia-
Pacific region, the motives for introducing such systems varied from
TABLE 1—SEATS DECIDED BY MAJORITY/PLURALITY AND PR
IN MIXED SYSTEMS
* no group may exceed three seats































country to country. In Northeast Asia, the mixed system was mainly
meant to ease the endemic political factionalism—bred by the single
nontransferable vote (SNTV)—that had come to bedevil Japan and, in
somewhat different ways, South Korea and Taiwan as well. Japanese
reformers hoped that electoral reform would foster the development of a
two-party system as well as political competition based on policy dif-
ferences rather than squabbles over patronage. In Korea and Taiwan,
where regional and national-identity cleavages are prominent, party
lists now vie for votes on a nationwide basis, which encourages parties
to pitch their policy messages nationally rather than tailor a number of
local appeals. In Thailand, by contrast, reformers hoped that a shift to a
mixed system with a majority of single-member districts would under-
cut the prevalence of “money politics,” as local candidates would not
have to rely on local agents to the same extent as they had in the past
when multimember “block-vote” rules applied. In the Philippines, list
seats are reserved for “sectoral interests” such as youth, labor, the urban
poor, farmers, fishermen, and women, an arrangement introduced with
the aim of breaking the stranglehold of the old elite families on national
politics.4
The reform trajectory in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific-island
countries has been rather different: The most influential electoral re-
form in recent years has been the replacement of plurality systems with
variants of Australia’s alternative-vote (AV) system, which is based on
single-member districts and requires that successful candidates gain
not just a plurality but an absolute majority of votes. Under this system,
voters rank-order candidates on the ballot paper in order of their choice,
marking “1” next to their most favored candidate, “2” by their second
choice, “3” by their third choice, and so on. Any candidate who gains
an absolute majority (50 percent plus 1) of first-preference votes is im-
mediately elected. If no one has a majority, the candidate with the lowest
vote total is “eliminated” from the count and each ballot giving that
candidate a “1” is rechecked for its second preference, which is then
“transferred to” (that is, counted as a vote for) the appropriate candidate
in a process that is repeated until one candidate has an absolute major-
ity or until there are no votes left in the count. The two largest
Pacific-island states, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, have both introduced
such systems in recent years to promote majority victors and to encour-
age interethnic accommodation, since under such a rule it often becomes
sensible for a candidate to seek the “2” or “3” votes of citizens from
outside the candidate’s ethnic base.5
In recent years, both mixed and (to a lesser extent) AV systems have
achieved popularity around the world and not just in the Asia-Pacific
region.6 Yet the Asia-Pacific’s experience of electoral reform has been
unusual by international standards in a number of ways. Overwhelm-
ingly, the democracies of this region have adopted electoral systems
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whose designs and outcomes are highly majoritarian, both structurally
and in practice. Strengthening political parties, reducing political frag-
mentation, countering SNTV-driven factionalism, and bolstering the
interests of large national parties over smaller or localized ones were
overt aims in almost all cases. Not coincidentally, such reforms also
tend to support the interests of political incumbents by enhancing re-
gime stability and raising the bar for new entrants to the political system.
Aurel Croissant, writing about the process of electoral reform in Korea,
noted that the “debate on electoral reforms focuses very much on the
question of how to improve the majority generating function of the
electoral system—i.e. its capability to produce single party majorities
in parliament.”7 This statement could well be applied across the Asia-
Pacific as a whole.
Throughout the region, reformers have also focused on encouraging
cohesive political parties while limiting ethnic or minority movements.
Both majoritarian-leaning mixed models (in Asia) and AV systems (in
the Pacific) tend to favor large, broad-based parties that compete for the
middle ground. These reform trends become even clearer after examin-
ing the many and varied attempts made by Asian and Pacific governments
to shape party-system development. In addition to using the design of
electoral systems to try to change the way that political parties func-
tion, many Asian and Pacific states have also attempted to reform their
party systems by directly engineering the rules that govern how parties
are formed, organized, and behave.
Party Engineering
Despite being indispensable to all functioning modern democracies,
parties have traditionally been seen as a social phenomenon beyond the
scope of deliberate engineering. In recent years, however, political re-
formers in a number of Asia-Pacific states have sought to influence
party-system development by strengthening internal party organiza-
tions, promoting crossregional branch structures, and countering the
rise of ethnic or regional parties. While such experiments have not yet
come under much scrutiny, they are likely to have important conse-
quences for governance in the region.
Scholars of democracy have long believed that political parties play
a crucial role not just in representing interests, aggregating preferences,
and forming governments, but also in managing conflict and promoting
political stability. The extent to which parties perform these functions
varies significantly, however, depending on the nature of the party sys-
tem. In systems comprising two large parties, for instance, cultivating
and maintaining support across a range of social groups is required to
win elections, and parties therefore have incentives to provide broad
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mented multiparty systems, by contrast, parties may need only a small
share of the vote to win office, and can thus focus on providing sectoral
benefits to their own supporters rather than appealing to the broader
electorate. At an extreme, such private goods can include the fruits of
nepotism, cronyism, and corruption—all
problems of long standing in Indonesia,
the Philippines, Thailand, and a number
of other Asia-Pacific states.
If we know that aggregative parties
and party systems are desirable, the next
question is how they can be nurtured. Forg-
ing cohesive party systems, particularly
in societies riven by deep communal
cleavages, is easier said than done. None-
theless, recent reforms in states such as
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand
have attempted to strengthen parties and
remodel party systems through a variety
of institutional incentives and constraints.
Three distinct strategies of “party engi-
neering” have emerged. First, there are those that seek to promote the
development of national party systems and hamper the growth of re-
gional, local, or secessionist parties. Then there are those that attempt
to control, influence, or restrict the number of parties. Finally come
those that try to strengthen party organizations by building stable party
structures from the top down.
The most direct means of fostering broad-based parties that offer
policies to the whole nation is to ensure that parties themselves are
elected on a national basis and need support from different regions of
the country and segments of the electorate. An increasing number of
Asia-Pacific states now require parties to take account of regional, eth-
nic, and religious balance when putting forward candidates for election.
Thailand, for example, requires registered parties to establish member-
ship and branch networks in each of the country’s four main regions,
while for the ostensibly nonpartisan Senate elections all regions must
be “equitably represented” on each candidate list. The Philippines re-
quires parties to meet similar region-transcending thresholds: By law,
each party must have an office in at least nine of the country’s sixteen
regions, and must gain support in more than half the cities and prov-
inces where their candidates run.8
Indonesia has taken the engineering of party systems the farthest.
While only three officially sanctioned and controlled “national” par-
ties were allowed under General Suharto’s so-called New Order regime
(which was in power from the mid-1960s to May 1998), more than a
hundred new parties (many with miniscule support bases) formed in just
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a few months after Suharto left office. This mushrooming of new parties
provoked widespread worry that political fragmentation and democratic
dysfunction might be in the offing.9 At the same time, there were over-
riding concerns—particularly with the breakaway of East Timor in
1999—of secessionism in provinces such as Aceh and Papua, and the
very real fear that the vast island country could splinter under separatist
pressures.
Indonesia’s political reformers therefore placed a complex bundle of
incentives and restraints upon party-system development. As a precon-
dition for competing in 1999’s transitional elections, all parties had to
demonstrate a national support base by establishing branches in one-
third of Indonesia’s then-27 provinces, as well as offices in more than
half the districts or municipalities within each province where a party
branch was claimed to exist. As Dwight King notes, “where previously
the number of election contestants was stipulated by law, permitting
only three, now they were limited on the basis of insufficient geographi-
cal coverage and depth of penetration of their organizations.”10 The 2004
election laws went even further: New parties had to establish branches in
two-thirds of all provinces and municipalities within those provinces,
while small parties that had failed in 1999 to gain more than 2 percent of
the seats in parliament’s lower house or 3 percent of seats in the regional
assemblies found themselves forced to merge with other parties in order
to qualify for the 2004 elections.
Similar but less draconian reforms have been introduced in Thai-
land, which has a long history of fragmented party politics leading to
ineffectual coalition governments and frequent military coups—the most
recent in September 2006, which will likely lead to a further round of
reforms. Currently, in addition to the crossregional membership require-
ments noted above, new parties must show that they have at least five
thousand members within six months of being registered. Thai authori-
ties have actively enforced these new laws, disallowing parties that fail
to meet them. In South Korea, local party organizations must prove that
they have a minimum number of party members in a specified number of
districts across the country, a requirement that “favors big parties above
minor parties [and] also contributes to political stability by preventing
extreme pluralism (that is, very small parties with limited public sup-
port) from emerging.”11 Such schemes thus echo the Indonesian reforms,
even though they are aimed at restricting political fragmentation gener-
ally, rather than separatist parties in particular.
A third approach has been to try to strengthen internal party organi-
zations by privileging party interests within the structure of government
or by changing the way that candidates are nominated. In both Indone-
sia and Thailand, for example, all lower-house candidates must represent
a political party—no independents may run. In Indonesia, new laws
governing party registration stress the systemic and educational role of
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parties, whose leaders have received significant powers over candidate
selection and replacement. A number of states, including less-devel-
oped countries such as Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, now also
make public funds available to qualifying parties.
Changes to parties’ internal-governance arrangements have also been
popular. In 2001, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party adopted a
new selection process for choosing its president that resembled U.S.-
style primaries, in a move designed to amplify the voices of ordinary
dues-paying members.12 The same year, the main South Korean parties
unveiled similar reforms, introducing primary elections for the party
leadership in a bid to revitalize membership. These reforms had an im-
mediate impact, enabling Roh Moo-hyun, a relative outsider, to win the
presidential nomination of the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP).
Roh’s rapid rise in popularity—particularly among younger voters—
and his election to the presidency in 2002 added great luster to the new
“people’s primary” and internal party-governance measures. Roh’s rise
also spurred the MDP’s rival, the Grand National Party, to announce
similar reforms. It remains to be seen whether these changes will be
sufficient to transform Korea’s weak, regionalized, and personality-domi-
nated party system into one based on true mass parties with a national
reach.13
A final means of engineering party stability is to encourage party
cohesion within parliament. One way of doing this is to restrict the
capacity of legislators to change parties once elected. “Party-hopping”
or “turncoatism”—often induced by offers of ministerial posts or other
rewards, and once widespread in many Asia-Pacific countries—has been
curtailed by the introduction of “antihopping” provisions in countries
such as Fiji, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and Thailand. In Thailand,
for example, the 1997 constitution mandated that candidates must be
members of a political party for at least 90 days prior to an election (the
standard interval between the end of a parliamentary term and the fresh
balloting is 45 days). As a result, politicians who switched parties to
help bring down a government usually could not legally run in any
subsequent election.14
These kinds of restrictions, however, have little sway over party de-
fections that take place outside the parliamentary arena or in periods
between elections. They also do little to combat the related problem of
multiple endorsements, where the same candidate may be nominated by
several parties, or where parties nominate multiple candidates for a
single-seat district—a common occurrence in the Philippines, Papua
New Guinea, and some Pacific-island states, where parties are weak and
often irrelevant. In Papua New Guinea, for example, many electors vote
for their local clan candidate rather than for political parties, meaning
that independents with no party affiliation have been a major force in
parliament. This has bred a degree of volatility that makes coherent
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governance difficult as parliamentary majorities shift from issue to is-
sue and vote to vote.
In response, the Papua New Guinea government in 2001 introduced
an ambitious reform package aimed at stabilizing executive govern-
ment and building a coherent party system from the top down. Under
the new rules, before parties can be registered to run in elections, they
must allow internal competition for leadership spots and demonstrate
both a written constitution and a dues-paying membership. The provi-
sion for party registration is tied to a new system of party funding under
which each registered party receives the equivalent of about US$3,000
per legislator every year (the country’s 2005 GNP per capita was $2,600
per year). The intent is to move parties away from being purely vehicles
for personal advancement, and to encourage prospective candidates to
run with parties rather than as independents. In addition, party-endorsed
members must now vote in accord with their party’s platform on key
parliamentary decisions, such as a vote of confidence in the prime min-
ister, or face a possible by-election. As every government elected prior
to 2002 fell prematurely due to party-hopping, these reforms constitute
one of the most far-reaching attempts to engineer a party system any-
where in the Asia-Pacific region.
Has Reform Worked?
In virtually all the Asian and Pacific-island democracies, one of
reform’s basic goals has been greater “political stability.” This can mean
several things. First, political stability sometimes refers to the mainte-
nance of formal democracy or the avoidance of civil strife.15 A more
precise definition of political stability relates to the tenure and compo-
sition of executive governments.16 Under this interpretation, political
and policy continuity depends significantly on the durability of cabi-
nets. Thus politics is more “stable” when governing executives are
durable in terms of both longevity and personnel; conversely, execu-
tives are “unstable” if their composition alters frequently, particularly
if governments change between elections due to no-confidence votes,
impeachments, party-hopping, or similar events.
One way to assess the impact of the electoral and party-system re-
forms discussed above is therefore to examine the average duration of
governments in the period before and after political reforms were en-
acted. In at least four states—Indonesia, Thailand, Papua New Guinea,
and the Philippines—advocates of changes to party laws and electoral
systems often pointed to the need for greater political stability. In each
of these cases, the longevity of executive governments has indeed im-
proved since political reforms were introduced.
The most striking improvement occurred in precoup Thailand, which
in the wake of the 1997 reforms went from an average government
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lifespan of just ten months to more than four years in the period to the
end of 2005. In the Philippines, the longevity of cabinets elected under
the 1987 constitution has also improved compared to the democratic
period before Ferdinand Marcos came to power in 1965, although
“people-power” revolutions have overthrown one elected president (Jo-
seph Estrada) and may yet claim others. In Indonesia, the longevity of
each post-Suharto president has increased incrementally. While Suharto’s
replacement, B.J. Habibie, lasted just seventeen months in office, he
initiated fundamental political reforms, including new electoral and
decentralization laws that greatly benefited his immediate successors,
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose administra-
tions lasted for 21 and 38 months respectively. In 2004, Indonesia in-
troduced direct presidential balloting. The winner, retired general Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, looks set to become the first elected president to
govern for a full term. Similarly, the 2001 reforms that Papua New Guinea
made to promote more-secure executive tenures have led to a marked
increase in political stability. In June 2006, current prime minister
Michael Somare will become the first leader since independence to
serve a full term instead of being overthrown from the floor of parlia-
ment. In each of these cases, reform appears to have enhanced stability,
at least as measured by the limited indicator of cabinet durability.
Attempts to engineer more broadly based party systems have also
met with modest success, though not always in the way intended. Most
TABLE 2—CHANGES IN THE EFFECTIVE NUMBERS OF
POLITICAL PARTIES
* Thailand’s most recent elections were held in April 2006 (five months before the coup), but were
boycotted by the opposition parties and subsequently annulled by the Constitutional Court. This
figure refers to the February 2005 elections.
† Papua New Guinea’s current parliament was elected in 2002, but with six seats left vacant due to
the failure of the election in one province. A series of by-elections have since filled these and other
vacant seats. This is the party composition of parliament as of 2005.
Source: Aurel Croissant, “Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia: A Comparative Perspective,”
in Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns, and Marei John, eds., Electoral Politics in Southeast and East
Asia (Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002), 329. Author’s calculations for the most recent
election outcomes and for all elections for Papua New Guinea and precoup Fiji, are based on the


































Asia-Pacific democracies have seen party fragmentation drop sharply in
recent years. Indonesia, for example, initially experienced a mushroom-
ing of more than a hundred new parties in the run-up to the 1999
elections. Only six achieved any significant representation, however,
and the Indonesian political system quickly became dominated by a
few large parties. Thus, although Indonesia’s parliament remains politi-
cally fragmented, and in fact experienced a rise in the “effective number
of parties”17 between 1999 and 2004, a more coherent party system with
broad support across the country does appear to be emerging.
A similar pattern appears to be at work in many other countries as
well. As Table 2 illustrates, based on the effective number of political
parties in parliament, party systems in Fiji, Japan, South Korea, Papua
New Guinea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand have all become
less fragmented lately. In countries such as Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan, embryonic two-party systems even seem to be emerging. At
least part of this change can be attributed to the wide-ranging engineer-
ing of electoral and party systems in these states. As such, the wave of
political reform that has swept the region over the past decade reflects
not the vague concepts of “Asian values” or “Asian-style democracy,”
but rather pragmatic efforts to build functioning democratic systems
that can spur development and have a realistic chance to endure.
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
Party engineering entails costs as well as benefits. Indonesia’s new
electoral laws, for instance, benefit incumbent parties by restricting
political competition and erecting barriers to potential new entrants
into the political marketplace. As a result, a danger of overkill inheres
in the new party provisions, especially as there are plans to heighten the
barriers facing smaller parties and new entrants. Under existing legisla-
tion, most parties elected in the 2004 elections will be barred from
competing in the next elections in 2009 because they failed to win
more than 3 percent of the seats in 2004. These parties will be encour-
aged to amalgamate with others in order to reach this support marker.
Even more severe restrictions will be placed on future candidates for the
presidency: Under current plans for the 2009 parliamentary elections,
only parties that win at least 20 percent of all votes cast, or at least 15
percent of the seats, will be entitled to run candidates for president and
vice-president. All this not only discriminates against smaller parties,
but tilts the electoral playing field markedly in favor of incumbents and
established parties.
The overkill issue applies even more strongly to Thailand, where the
1997 constitution contained so many incentives favoring strong parties
that it may have unbalanced Thai democracy. In particular, the elec-
toral and party reforms facilitated the rapid emergence of Prime Minister
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Thaksin Shinawatra (one of Thailand’s richest men) and his Thai Rak
Thai (TRT) party as Thailand’s dominant political players. Already in a
commanding position following the 2001 elections, Thaksin initiated a
series of postelection mergers and coalition deals with other parties that
led to TRT dominating parliament and winning the 2005 elections by a
massive margin. Following a damaging public row over his family’s
sale of telecommunications shares, however, Thaksin miscalculated by
calling snap elections in April 2006 that were boycotted by the opposi-
tion parties. Although the TRT won, the results of these elections were
subsequently annulled by the Constitutional Court. In September 2006,
while Thaksin was visiting the United Nations in New York, the Thai
military conducted a bloodless coup that removed him from office and
abrogated the 1997 constitution. While new elections have been prom-
ised for 2007, it remains to be seen whether genuine democracy will be
restored, especially given the apparently widespread popular support
for the coup.
Elsewhere, the impacts of political engineering seem to be more posi-
tive. For instance, while the longer-term effects of Papua New Guinea’s
revised political arrangements will not be evident until the next elec-
tions are held in 2007, political consolidation does appear to have
improved on a number of measures. Party fragmentation has fallen
sharply, from 42 registered parties in 2001 to 15 in 2004, as has the
number of candidates standing as independents. The experience of the
new electoral system has also been encouraging: Six by-elections held
in 2004 under the “limited-preferential” AV system all saw a sharp in-
crease in the winning margins of successful candidates, each of whom
gained an absolute majority of the vote, and a reduction in electoral
violence compared to earlier elections. In ethnically divided Fiji, de-
spite dire predictions to the contrary, the April 2006 elections also went
smoothly. Attempts to engineer cooperation across communal lines re-
ceived a boost when the victorious Fijian United Party formed the
country’s first multiethnic power-sharing cabinet with the predomi-
nantly Indo-Fijian opposition.18
How are we to interpret the broader implications of this “two steps
forward, one step back” approach to political change in the Asia-Pacific
region? It could be that the region’s turn toward majoritarian politics
signals a drift away from democratic values toward a new form of illib-
eral democracy—in effect, a return to Asia’s long experience with
dictatorial, autocratic, monarchic, or other forms of illiberal rule. But
there are reasons to be optimistic. If the Asia-Pacific’s emerging democ-
racies can make the transition from fragmented, personalized, and
unstable political systems to cohesive, programmatic, and stable ones—
as at least some appear to be doing—their prospects for both democracy
and development will be significantly enhanced, as will their ability to
manage internal conflicts. While political engineering cannot guaran-
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tee the achievement of these goals, it appears to be one means of smooth-
ing and straightening the path.19
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